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There are obvious reasons why residential construction should depend on the
population’s age structure. We estimate this relation on Swedish time series data
and OECD panel data. Large groups of young adults are associated with higher
rates of residential construction. But there is also a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
from those above 75. Age eﬀects on residential investment are robust and forecast
well out-of-sample in contrast to the corresponding house price results. This may
explain why the debate around house prices and demography has been rather
inconclusive. Rapidly aging populations in the industrialized world makes the
future look bleak for the construction industry of these countries.
Sammanfattning
Det ﬁnns uppenbara skäl att förvänta sig att bostadsinvesteringar bör bero
på befolkningens åldersstruktur. Vi skattar denna relation i en svensk tidsserie
samt i en länderpanel omfattande OECD-länder. Stora grupper unga vuxna
samvarierar med högre bostadsinvesteringar som andel av BNP. Men det ﬁnns
också en signiﬁkant negativ eﬀekt från åldersgruppen över 75. Ålderseﬀekterna
på bostadsinvesteringarna är robusta och ger goda prognoser för data bortom ur-
valet som använts för skattningen. Detta kontrasterar mot motsvarande resultat
för husprisekvationer. Dessa resultat kan förklara varför debatten kring huspriser
och demograﬁ inte har lett till någon konsensus om eﬀekterna. Snabbt åldrande
befolkningar i den industrialiserade världen innebär dystra framtidsutsikter för
byggnadsindustrin i dessa länder.
01. Age Distribution and Housing Demand
The debate following the publication of the much-cited paper ”The Baby Boom,
the Baby Bust, and the Housing Market” by Mankiw and Weil (1989) demon-
strated that estimating the eﬀect of demographic change on housing demand
entails some stumbling blocks. A number of criticisms were raised against the
Mankiw and Weil argument. Some papers suggest that the demographic eﬀect
vanishes when a properly speciﬁed model is tested (e.g. Engelhardt and Poterba,
1991), but there is no real consensus around which model is properly speciﬁed.
Swan (1995) argues that the demographic demand variable constructed by Mankiw
and Weil, in eﬀect double counts population rather than measuring demand and
ignores real income growth, but still ﬁnds substantial demographic eﬀects after
correction for that.
One diﬃculty is that using cross-section data to assess the housing demand of
diﬀerent age groups confound diﬀerences between cohorts with diﬀerences between
age groups (Green and Hendershott, 1996). There are, however, several other
reasons why house prices may move out of step with demographic change. First,
the asset price of houses may move in the opposite direction of rental rates, since
the latter depends on user costs while the former also depend on anticipated capital
gains, a point made by Hamilton (1991), and the demand for housing, of course,
reacts on the rental rate rather than the asset price. Second, institutional and
social changes may cause a move towards home-ownership that could drive house
prices upwards even if rental rates and housing demand are decreasing. Third, the
standard Poterba (1984) model of stock-ﬂow equilibrium in the housing market
also implies that the price responses to persistent shocks may be confounded by
initial overshooting due to the time lag inherent in adjustment of the housing
stock. An initial price increase in response to a positive demand shock may be
masked in data by the following decreases as prices adjust downwards as the
housing stock adapts.
The quantity response is, however, unambiguous in direction. One crucial
point is that in the long run housing supply should be very elastic. Hence persis-
tent changes in demand–e.g. demographically induced changes–will mainly be
reﬂected in quantity rather than price adjustments. Holland (1991) makes this
point and shows that US net residential investment actually is cointegrated with
the Mankiw-Weil demand variable, while that is not the case for real house prices.
Pettersson (1990) in a Swedish study on historical data back to the 19th century
also notes a connection between demography and building cycles.
1Our approach is inspired by the cited papers but diﬀers by letting the inﬂuence
of population age shares be directly estimated without imposing a given form
on how demand varies with demography. The gain of this is that age eﬀects
are estimated without any potentially inappropriate a priori restrictions. This
approach also makes it easy to forecast using demographic projections. We do
indeed ﬁnd that in Swedish post-war data residential investment has a stable
and theoretically expected long-run statistical relation to the age distribution.
Young people at the age of household formation show a positive correlation to
residential investment and old people have a strong negative eﬀect. But we fail
to ﬁnd a similar stable relation between the age distribution and house prices
although a strong correlation is present. Our estimates of age eﬀects on residential
investment on the other hand remain quite stable over diﬀerent housing policy
regimes. Similar results hold in an OECD cross-country panel thus corroborating
our Swedish results.
In the next section we ﬁrst establish that a strong and stable correlation be-
tween residential investment and age structure is present in both a Swedish time
series 1950-1996 and an OECD panel 1964-1995. In Section 3 we discuss the the-
oretical background further and demonstrate that house price regressions on age
structure fail to show a corresponding stability. Finally in Section 4 we sum up
our observations and conclusions.
2. Residential investment and age structure
Our point of departure is an exploration of the correlation pattern between age
structure and residential investment. We use Swedish residential investment 1950-
1996 as share of GDP as dependent variable and regress this on the population
age shares. Details regarding data can be found in the appendix. Since the sum
of age shares equals one we drop the intercept rather than an arbitrary age share.
It is intuitively simpler to interpret estimates using all age shares. We need to
keep in mind though that the linear combination of age shares also estimates the
intercept.
The level of detail in the speciﬁcation of the age distribution entails an im-
portant trade-oﬀ. Age group shares are rather highly correlated and it will in
general be diﬃcult or impossible to achieve reasonably precise estimates of age
group coeﬃcients if all one-year groups or even all ﬁve-year age groups are used
as regressors. In the literature this is dealt with either by aggregating the infor-
mation of the distribution into one or two variables (using dependency ratios or
2mean age or age group ratios) or by imposing a polynomial restriction on the co-
eﬃcients (like in Fair and Dominguez, 1991 or Higgins, 1998). Mankiw and Weil
(1989) also construct their housing demand variable by imposing a housing de-
mand structure that has been estimated in a microeconomic cross-section. These
restrictions, however, discard some information on relative movements in the dis-
tribution that are important. Curiously, Mankiw and Weil actually report two
diﬀerent age proﬁles estimated from microeconomic data. From the diﬀerences in
these proﬁles it seems that the elasticity of demand diﬀers over age groups, thus
a priori invalidating the restriction imposed. We have found that aggregation to
ﬁve or six age groups with approximately homogeneous economic behavior is a
working compromise in most situations.
Here we subdivide the population into six age groups. Children 0-14 years old
obviously do not take economic decisions themselves, but are rather the result
of economic decisions. Therefore, when we later (in the panel estimations) have
to drop an age group we drop the children. Young adults 15-29 years old is the
group where household formation takes place. Mature adults 30-49 years old are
predominantly found in family households with children. T h em i d d l ea g e d50-64
years old are at their peak income and net savers. Young retirees 65-74 years
old are still active consumers but no longer working. Old retirees 75 and above
are more exposed to ill health restrictions and have considerably higher mortality
rates.
2.1. Swedish residential investment 1950-1996
D e m o g r a p h i cp r o j e c t i o n sw i t hr e l a t i v e l yl o wu n c e r t a i n t yc a nb em a d ea tl e a s t2 0
or more years into the future. Although this paper is not about forecasting per
se, it is of interest to start by exploring how well a pure age model of residential
investment is forecasting out-of-sample. This is so because in regressing variables
with high persistence on each other there is always a risk of spurious results. Out-
of-sample forecasts provide a good check against this. In Table 1 we therefore
present the results from exploring a pure age model with and without lags of
the dependent variable and comparing these with estimates on non-residential
construction in order to rule out that we are picking up some general business
conditions eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that working age population has a positive eﬀect on residential in-
vestment while increasing population shares in the dependent age groups have a
depressing eﬀect on residential construction. In the pure age model the youngest
3adult age groups have a more positive eﬀect on residential construction than the
older working age groups.
The estimates for non-residential construction, although equally dependent on
age structure, show a quite diﬀerent age pattern. Here, there is a clear peak for
the 50-64 age groups. Thus we can exclude the possibility that we happen to
catch a general investment eﬀect in the age pattern.
In all cases the age speciﬁcation captures a very substantial part of the varia-
tion in construction activity, see Figure 1, where we include the predictions from
a pure age model and compare them to the latest data from Statistics Sweden for
1993-2003. The predicted upturn around 2010 reﬂects an increase in the share of
young adults in the population as the baby boom cohorts born around 1990 reach
the age of household formation.
While it is uncontroversial to claim that a larger inﬂo wo fy o u n gp e o p l ei n t ot h e
age groups of household formation will shift up housing demand and consequently
are expected to stimulate residential investment, the claim that increasing old
age groups will depress housing demand is more controversial, since it could be
ac o h o r te ﬀect due to increasing life time incomes over cohorts. It is, therefore,
important to evaluate the evidence on this point more closely.
Pitkin and Myers (1994) investigates this and ﬁnds that there are indeed strong
cohort eﬀects, but there still remain a depressing eﬀect from the oldest when that
is controlled for. Theoretically optimal life cycle consumption plans will under
ﬁnite life assumptions attain a pronounced hump shape over age. Empirical evi-
dence indicates that hump shaped demand over age is present for many types of
consumption and that age-speciﬁc mortality rates indeed are important explana-
tions, although there are probably also other mechanisms at work, see e.g. the
study by Banks et al. (1998).
Increasing death rates when the share of old people increases also means more
vacancies will be created in the existing stock, everything else equal. The demand
eﬀect from an increasing share of retirees with declining housing consumption is
thus reinforced by a supply eﬀect as well.
A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1t h e r ei so n ep e r i o da r o u n d1 9 9 0w h e nt h eﬁto ft h e
pure age model is less good. This can be chalked up to a structural break in the
time series. There was a major Swedish tax reform in 1991 that made interest
deductible against capital income–at a uniform tax rate of 30 percent–instead of
as previously against income with marginal tax rates ranging between 30 and up
to 80 percent. For most people this reform meant a substantial increase in capital
costs. At the same time a gradual withdrawal of interest subsidies for housing
4and an introduction of property taxes on own homes further increased user costs
and caused a collapse in the residential construction market as house values on
average plummeted with around 25 percent. Still, in spite of this confounding
break at the end of the time series the forecast model performs very well. The
out-of-sample forecast from 1997 and onwards catches the general trend in the
out-of-sample years extremely well for such a long forecast horizon. That is prima
facie evidence against the possibility of a spurious regression. If the relation is
spurious such forecast performance is extremely unlikely.
Introducing lags in the speciﬁcation picks up persistent eﬀects from the variables–
and we would expect housing demand eﬀects to be persistent. With a lag coef-
ﬁcient of around 0.8 the long-term eﬀect is approximately 1/(1 − 0.8) = 5 times
larger, so the age coeﬃcients should decrease by a factor 5. This is approximately
true for the young adults but not for the other age groups. This may be indicating
that indirect and less persistent eﬀects are attributed to the age coeﬃcients when
we control for low frequency variation by the lagged dependent variable.
The autoregressive coeﬃcient is also fairly high causing renewed concern that
R2sa n dt-values are unreliable. The rule of thumb that R2 greater than the
Durbin-Watson statistic indicates spurious regression means that this possibility
still cannot be ignored. Although the pure age model seems to pick up the trends
in construction fairly well and also exhibit the expected age proﬁle, some statis-
tical problems still are present which merit further investigation in the following
sections.
2.2. Framework for interpretation
To continue the investigation it is helpful to have a look at the theoretical frame-
work underlying the Mankiw-Weil debate to interpret the estimations. The stan-
dard stock-ﬂow partial equilibrium model developed in Poterba (1984) describes
the adjustment of house prices and the housing stock to long-run equilibrium.
Although more elaborate general equilibrium models are available today (see Le-
ung 2004 for an overview), the debate based on Mankiw and Weil (1989) which
our paper centers on were mainly within the Poterba framework. While richer
models, of course, contribute to a more complete picture of the housing market
and its interaction with the macroeconomy our ambition is limited to the more
modest empirical demonstration that quantity adjustment is well captured by
demographics while prices are not.
Under the usual regularity conditions we can solve for the short-run equilibrium
5rental rate q∗ = q(H) which is decreasing in the housing stock H and derive
the dynamic path of the standard unit house price Q. Let the user costs of the
standard unit be ν, which includes depreciation, repair and maintenance costs,
and real capital costs (net of taxes). Real house price changes are then given by
˙ Q = −q(H)+νQ. (2.1)
Following Poterba (1984) construction investment, ψ(Q,r) is assumed to be
an increasing function of real house prices but we add to this that residential
investment could also be a decreasing function of real capital costs, r.A d d i n ga
depreciation term the dynamics of the housing stock are then described by
˙ H = ψ(Q,r) − δH. (2.2)
Setting the rates of change to zero we get what amounts to long-run demand and
supply schedules. The intersection determines the steady-state values of the real
house price and the housing stock in long-run equilibrium.
Within this standard model framework age structure may aﬀect several rela-
tions. Here only two important points are noted:
• First, the level of the rental rate for a given housing stock should increase
with the number of people in high demand age groups, i.e. essentially the
working population. This shifts the long-run demand schedule upwards.
House prices momentarily increase but along the adjustment path negative
rates of change will be observed following the shock. Since an age shock is
persistent and takes place in many small steps, it will be hard to distinguish
the impact eﬀect from the adjustment eﬀects in actual data.
• Second, the quantity of housing demanded increases with income growth.
This eﬀect is higher for the younger cohorts with anticipated higher life cycle
income than for the older. This implies a continuous upward drift of the
demand schedule with income growth that is moderated according to the
age structure. This drift makes separate empirical identiﬁcation of income
and age eﬀects diﬃcult.
Age structure related shifts in housing demand imply that the dynamic process
is aiming at a shifting steady-state target. In particular we would expect an
upward drift due to income growth. As remarked in the introduction real income
growth cannot be ignored and recent papers, like Davis and Heathcote (2005) using
6a production function approach, verify that this is empirically important at the
macro level. To get rid of this systematic shift we focus on the ratio of residential
investment to GDP. Admittedly this is a rough way of compensating for the drift
b u ti th a st h ea d v a n t a g eo fp l a c i n gt h em e a s u r e m e n te r r o rw em a k ei nu s i n gG D P
for personal income on the left hand side of the regression equation thus avoiding
the bias we would otherwise have to deal with. The income elasticity of demand
is commonly assumed to be unitary while the corresponding elasticity of supply
is controversial but commonly found to be rather high, see e.g. Harter-Dreiman
(2004). The empirical results below do not indicate that this approximation leads
to any systematic bias although standard errors may be higher than they would
have been in a more sophisticated speciﬁcation.
In Figure 2 we see the Swedish age distribution from 1950 to 2000. If the
supply schedule is stationary we would expect that the entry of the 1940s baby
boom into middle age brackets will shift the demand schedule for housing relative
to income downwards since they are now at the peak of their housing career.
As the 1940s cohorts start to retire in the next decade we would expect housing
demand to subside further and then to rise again as the latest baby boom reach
household formation ages.
The income normalized gross volume of housing construction I in short-run
equilibrium is linearized using equation (2.2).
I = α0 + αQ + βr, α > 0,β<0. (2.3)
Substituting for Q by using equation (2.1) we can express residential investment
as a fraction of GDP, I, as
I = α0 + α
q + ˙ Q
ν
+ βr (2.4)
Our basic assumption that housing demand varies systematically over age leads
to a dependence of the rental rate q on the age distribution of the population.
We do not derive the form of this inﬂuence but approximate it by a sum of
weighted age group shares where the weights are to be estimated. We use shares
since we also want to avoid the upward shift in aggregate housing demand caused
by population growth. The normalisation of the dependent variable by dividing
with GDP accounts both for increases in GDP per capita and population growth.
Using ak for the age group’s share of total population we arrive at a regression
7speciﬁcation that extends the pure age model estimated above









User cost per index unit ν is part of the coeﬃcients for age structure and the
rate of change in house prices. Unless α/υ is at least stationary over time this
may cause problems. However, modelling user costs explicitly leads into practical
measurement diﬃculties. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable measures for the relevant
marginal tax rate as well as the expected real interest rates. Even more important
in this long time series context we have in the Swedish case shifts in housing
policies. These shifts aﬀect user costs in ways that are very hard to summarize in
any simple form. The robustness of the pure age model gives an indication that
it is defensible to simplify by assuming the coeﬃcients to be stationary, and this
is vindicated by the results below.
Though we cannot take into account all possible shifts in user costs, the theory
indicates that we should at least control for capital costs, but real interest is al-
ready included in equation 2.5. In Table 2 we report results using the speciﬁcation
above. House price changes and real interest are lagged one step since planning
and adjustment lags in construction are quite long.
This speciﬁcation turns out to improve the precision of the age estimates con-
siderably. Recursive coeﬃcient estimates with successively shorter time series are
stable back to the late 1970s even if there is some minor turbulence in the extreme
years in the beginning of the 1990s, when tax reforms and strongly increasing
loan-to-value ratios rattled Swedish mortgage markets. Thus, we feel conﬁdent
of the empirical validity of our assumption about stationary coeﬃcients. Since
house price changes and real interest rates could be suspected of endogeneity and
simultaneity we also run instrumented regressions.1
The age coeﬃcients are quite stable over diﬀerent speciﬁcations, with the ex-
ception of young retirees which becomes statistically insigniﬁcant as a tax reform
dummy (=1 from 1991 and onwards) is introduced along with a dummy for capital
market deregulation (=1 from 1985 and onwards). A strong positive eﬀect from
age groups in the process of household formation and a strong negative eﬀect from
age groups over 75 conform to the results in Table 1. The essential diﬀerence to
the pure age model is the negative eﬀect from the middle-aged. This may have to
1The instrument set includes the third and fourth lag of the house price index and the second
and third lag of inﬂation and real interest rates.
8do with their portfolio shift from real to ﬁnancial assets, i.e. with asset demand
rather than housing demand.2 Inter alia Andersson (2001) for Sweden and Skin-
ner (1989) for the US present microeconomic evidence that such a portfolio shift
really takes place around 50 years of age. House price changes have the expected
positive eﬀe c ta n dt h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect from real interest is also expected in the
investment equation. However, the interest eﬀect vanishes when we instrument
the regressions.
The tax regime change in 1991 and the capital market deregulation in the
1980s should have aﬀected both interest and inﬂation responses in the economy.
Both these structural breaks may explain why the Durbin-Watson test for ﬁrst-
order serial correlation is in the middle of the inconclusive range where we can
neither accept nor reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals.
Indeed as we control for the structural breaks the null of no ﬁrst-order serial
correlation is accepted at the ﬁve percent level. The tax reform signiﬁcantly
raised user costs so it is slightly surprising that we get a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of the change in tax regime on residential investment. Recall, however, that
increases in user costs would directly impact on the rate of house price change,
which is already included. The coeﬃcient of ∆Q increases considerably when the
tax reform dummy is included thus indicating a collinearity eﬀect. Excluding
the price change variable (not reported) indeed changes the sign of the tax reform
dummy to the expected negative value. The negative dummy coeﬃcient for capital
market deregulation decreases residential investment levels compared to previous
regulated markets. Since the purpose of the abolished regulation was to stimulate
housing construction by diﬀerent forms of subsidies this is what we would expect.
Summing up the time series evidence so far we have two tentative conclusions.
• There are strong and important age structure eﬀects that explain most of
the variation in residential investment in Sweden since 1950.
• The negative eﬀect from the 75+ group on residential investment as com-
pared with its eﬀect on non-residential construction is consistent with a
considerable negative eﬀect on housing demand by declining individual de-
mand in this group. However, as mentioned mortality rates are accelerating
2This conjecture is based on the observation that the negative eﬀect is much less when we
do not restrict the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst and second lag of prices to be equal in magnitude.
Then the positive ﬁrst lag eﬀect is greater. The theoretical restriction to a diﬀerenced term thus
tends to underestimate the total price eﬀect on investment and some of the negative relative
price eﬀects of the portfolio shift are caught by the age group instead.
9at this age creating more vacancies in the existing stock and this is probably
a complementary important supply channel for the negative eﬀect.
There are no longer any indications that the regression might be spurious.
The residuals are stationary and in fact passes a test for normal distribution. Be-
cause cointegration implies that the LS estimates are superconsistent, converging
faster than normal to the true values, we found it worthwhile to estimate an error
correction model–a methodology that has otherwise mostly been used in house
price models, see e.g. Malpezzi (1999) for a general apporach and Heiborn (1998)
who applies it to Mankiw-Weil type age demand variables in the Swedish context.
The ECM estimates are reported in the last column of Table 2. The coeﬃcient
on the linear combination of age shares (using the values in column 4) minus the
residential investment lag is close to 0.9 indicating a fairly fast convergence to the
long-run equilibrium. The restriction of the coeﬃcient for the linear combination
of age shares to be the same with opposite sign as the coeﬃcient for the residential
investment lag is clearly accepted by the data. We take this as ﬁnal evidence that
spurious regression is no issue here. In the appendix a more detailed account of
the ECM model can be found.
2.3. Panel data OECD 1964-1995
The time series estimates for Sweden could be unique for some institutional or
historical reason. Therefore we decided to check a cross-country panel sample to
see if the results survive in a wider context. For panel regressions to work well
the cross-section sample should be reasonably homogeneous in order to minimize
problems with model heterogeneity. This consideration led us to focus on OECD
data with similar income levels and construction technology, although there are
still large disparities in terms of housing policies and mortgage markets that could
make heterogeneity an issue. Imperfections in capital markets are important de-
terminants of both house prices and construction (Chen 2001, Ortalo-Magne and
Rady 2004) and housing credit markets do diﬀer quite a lot across countries. The
results below must therefore be interpreted as average patterns with potentially
substantial variation across countries.
When we use panel data we can estimate a ﬁxed eﬀect model which allows
us to take account of unobservable country-speciﬁce ﬀects as well as time-speciﬁc
eﬀects. This gives us a better control for omitted variables and period and cohort
eﬀects. The assumption is that the error term can be decomposed as
uit = µi + κt + εit (2.6)
10where the country-speciﬁce ﬀect µi is taken to be constant as is the time-speciﬁc
eﬀect κt and εit a white noise disturbance. An assumption that these terms are
all random results in a more eﬃcient estimator since no degrees of freedom are
lost estimating ﬁxed parameters. However, this random eﬀects model is also more
sensitive to mis-speciﬁcation bias of diﬀerent kinds. Our speciﬁcation is based on
several radical simpliﬁcations and may well suﬀer from speciﬁcation problems so
w ep r e f e rt h em o r er o b u s tﬁxed eﬀects estimator.
In Table 3 we report a number of regressions with housing investment as the
dependent variable and both ﬁxed time and country eﬀects. In the panel esti-
m a t i o n sw eh a v et od r o po n ea g eg r o u p( c h i l d r e n )s i n c ew ee s t i m a t et i m e -a n d
country-speciﬁc intercepts (also note that the Durbin-Watson statistic is not re-
ported since it is invalid in the panel context). In column 1 we now see a somewhat
diﬀerent age pattern with the 30-49 group having the largest positive eﬀect on res-
idential investment. It is well known that many countries in Southern Europe as
well as Japan exhibit a pattern of household formation that is considerably de-
layed as compared to the Swedish pattern where almost everybody have left home
at the age of 30 (for one explanation relying on availability of housing credits,
see Chiuri and Jappelli 2003 who are using an extensive international micro data
material).
In column 2 we put in the relative price of investment as a proxy for house
prices and capital costs as a means to get some control for diﬀerences in credit
availability. This is signiﬁcant with the correct sign but the age pattern reappears
although with an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for the 50-64 age group. The relative
price of investment is likely to be simultaneously determined with residential in-
vestment shares so in column 3 we also report TSLS estimates.3 This reestablishes
t h e1 5 - 2 9g r o u pa st h ep r i m ep o s i t i v ei n ﬂuence on residential investment but the
middle age group is still insigniﬁcant separating the OECD pattern from the previ-
ously found Swedish time series pattern. Coeﬃcients shrink and are less precisely
estimated as we instrument for relative investment prices. However, as subsidiary
evidence that the correlation between age structure and residential investment is a
general phenomenon not due to peculiarities of the Swedish data, these results do
corroborate our previous results. The evidence also indicate that the precise age
pattern is likely to be quite sensitive to national peculiarities in the availability of
housing ﬁnance.
3Instruments are age variables and lagged GDP deﬂators and the second and third lag of the
relative price itself.
113. Age Eﬀects on House Prices?







∆Q + u (3.1)
where we would expect the age variables to show the same pattern up to a constant
multiplier as in the residential investment equation. Note that our formulation also
makes the dynamic system recursive and allows us to ignore residential investment
as an independent factor in the determination of house prices.
3.1. Swedish house prices 1952-1999
Demographic data and CPI indexes were obtained from Statistics Sweden and
house price series 1952-1999 (linked from Statistics Sweden sources) was kindly
put at our disposal by Lennart Berg who also provided the interest series based
on rates of interest oﬀered by mortgage underwriters. Further details on data are
available in the appendix.
As is clear from Figure 3 there are two quite distinct regimes in house price
dynamics in Sweden, one calm period up to 1978-1979 and another much more
volatile thereafter, which correspond to the beginning of the deregulation of the
previously highly regulated housing and credit market. In order to get any sensible
results at all in the price regressions we therefore had to make the age coeﬃcients
regime dependent by multiplying one set of age variables with a dummy for the
period 1979-1999 and then including both sets of variables in the regression. The
ﬁrst two columns in Table 4 report a LS estimate for the early period. The second
column specify the addition that has to be made to the ﬁrst column in order to
get the coeﬃcient for the later period. As witnessed by the estimated model in
F i g u r e3t h i sg i v e saf a i r l yg o o dﬁt.
Starting with the least squares estimate in the ﬁrst column, the coeﬃcients
in the period 1953-78 are actually the opposite of the expected pattern. The age
groups that promote residential investment actually lowers prices and vice versa
except for the positive coeﬃcient on the young adults. This could be because we
are estimating a reverse causality where increased residential investment causes
prices to go down. It is, however, also possible that this reﬂects the rather heavy
subsidies to families with children and pensioners during this period, which should
have made these groups less price sensitive. However, adding the second column
12for the later period we get very strong positive eﬀects from the young and the
elderly but an equally strong negative eﬀect from mature adults. This is much
harder to make any sense of, since subsidies have been successively removed or
diminished during this period. There is also a clear indication of autocorrelation
in the residuals so further investigation is needed.
The TSLS estimate4 in columns 3 and 4 (with price change on the LHS and
including interest on the RHS as a control) yields marginally more reasonable
results. There is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation and the estimates in the regulation
period could be rationalized if the middle aged are no longer saving in real estate
and thus inﬂuence prices negatively. However, as we add the dummy interacted
coeﬃcients the strong negative mature adult eﬀect is still not credible even though
the rest are at least in the approximately right direction.
Testing for a unit root in house prices this cannot be rejected. Thus we may
have a spurious regression problem. In order to see if more sensible results can
be achieved by using the change in price on the LHS instead, i.e. assuming that




γkak + γ3Q + u (3.2)
was estimated by GMM and reported in the last two columns. Since we would
now expect a reversed pattern only the negative eﬀect of young adults is really
expected.
It is conceivable, however, that the group of age variables would perform well
for forecasting even if insuﬃcient variation, reverse causality and multicollinearity
prevent reasonable individual coeﬃcient estimates. After all, the ﬁt of the pure
age model in Figure 3 is not that bad, even if we identify the age coeﬃcients in
the deregulated period by only some twenty observations. However, projecting a
forecast of the pure age model for prices results in a 400 percent real price index
increase by 2010, a forecast which clearly cannot be taken seriously. Thus, we
conclude that age variables perform much more poorly in Swedish house price
equations than in residential investment equations. To judge from our results this
is probably due to...
• ...residential investment adapting to the demographic changes in a similar
4Both the instrumented estimates in Table 4 have an instrument list that includes–besides
age variables–the second and third lag of real interest rates, real house prices and inﬂation.
13way both under the current market regime and under the previous more
regulated regime.
• ...that the impact eﬀect and adjustment eﬀect of residential investment goes
in the same direction, which is not the case for the price eﬀect where the
impact eﬀect overshoots the equilibrium level.
• ...that residential investment covers the whole housing market and not only
owner-occupied housing where prices do not necessarily co-vary with the
relevant demand price, that is the rental price.
More sophisticated models can, of course, be developed in order to estimate
price eﬀects from demography–and above references to such work have been
given–but the simple and easy-to-forecast approach just using age structure and
demographic projections– that works for residential investment–will not work
for house prices.
4. Conclusions
The Mankiw-Weil debate on demography and housing demand could give the
impression that demographic eﬀects on housing demand are unimportant or spu-
rious. As we have tried to show in this paper, such a conclusion can be mistaken.
A preliminary conclusion is that theoretical considerations and empirical data,–
although not strictly conclusive– support a clear eﬀect of demographic change
on residential construction even if the price eﬀect for several reasons may be less
clear-cut. Given limitations in the data available, our empirical results show that
the quantity eﬀects work much the same over diﬀerent ﬁnancial regimes as well
as housing policy changes.
An o t e w o r t h yﬁnding –in view of the rapid population aging that the OECD
countries will undergo in the next century–is the negative eﬀect on residential
construction of increases in the old age population. This is a robust feature in our
Swedish results as well as in the OECD panel results. It is a feature we should
expect when a population of individuals with ﬁnite lives gets older.
It would, therefore, be unwise to ignore that population ageing might aﬀect
housing demand negatively. Rather, more research into clarifying the mechanisms
of these eﬀects seems called for. An important reason is that the correlation
between age structure and residential construction can prove to be a valuable
forecasting tool. A good forecasting performance of a very simple regression of
14residential investment on age structure in out-of-sample Swedish data for several
years ahead does not contradict this possibility.
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16A. Data appendix
We have used several sources for our data, and the Swedish time series are not
publicly available, but we will provide the relevant data on request for anyone
interested in replicating our results.
Our Swedish residential investment variable was kindly provided by Byggen-
treprenörerna, an organization for Swedish construction ﬁrms. Data from this
source are available in a consistent series 1950-1996 while National Accounts data
have to be linked due to changes in deﬁnition. The residential investment (ex-
pressed in constant 1991 SEK) was divided by total GDP (also in constant 1991
SEK) to get the rate used in the regressions.
The house price measure is a real estate index constructed on the basis of real
estate taxation values. Taxation values are based on local market transactions
weighted by the distribution of local real estate over a number of standard cat-
egories. It therefore also reﬂects the upward trend in housing standards. In its
current form this index is available from 1975 and onwards. Lennart Berg at Upp-
sala University has interpolated the series backwards to 1952 by trends in local
market transaction prices (so called ’köpeskillingskoeﬃcienter’). We also owe him
for the compilation of mortgage interest rates that we have used as controls. De-
mographic data are from Statistics Sweden, estimates and projections downloaded
in 1997.
In the panel estimation we use disaggregated investment data from OECD
(1997) Economic Outlook. Our basic OECD sample contains 18 of the OECD
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many (BRD), Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Missing data for several coun-
tries in the beginning of the 1960s made it simpler to start from 1964. We have
a full set of annual observations from 1964-1995, except for West Germany, for
w h i c ht h ee c o n o m i cs e r i e se n di n1 9 9 4 . W et h e nh a v ea tm o s t3 2c o m p l e t eo b -
servations per country (31 for West Germany). Since we lose one observation in
calculating growth rates our estimation sample adds up to a total of 557 obser-
vations. Annual demographic data are from United Nations (1994) starting in
1950. Again West Germany is an exception: we obtained age structure data for
this country from Statistisches Bundesamt.
The investment rates were in this case taken from current price ratios. The
comparability over countries of price deﬂators is dubious, so we considered the
c u r r e n tp r i c er a t i o st ob es a f e r .W eh a dd i ﬃculties in ﬁnding comparable interest
17and house price data for the whole sample and ﬁnally substituted the relative price
of investment to get some proxy for these variables. These data were obtained
from OECD (1997) National Accounts.
B. ECM equation
Standard tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residential investment
share series is integrated of order 1. In the sample period this will be the case
for several of the age share series, too. There is thus hypothetically a risk that
the high t-values and R2s are spurious regression results. Also a fractionally
integrated series–”long memory” or persistent series–may give rise to spurious
regression in the sense that t-values and R2 converges to spurious values (Tsay
and Chung 2000).
However, if the age shares form a linear combination with the residential in-
vestment series and that linear combination is stationary, our results should still be
consistent. In fact they are superconsistent with substantially faster convergence
to the true parameter values than an ordinary OLS estimate. In order to check
whether spurious regression is a problem we estimate an error correction model
based on the speciﬁcation we used above. Estimating a co-integrating vector by
e.g. the Johansen procedure cannot be implemented in this case. Johansen’s
method is based on a VAR-system where it is assumed that the co-integrating
variables are endogenously determined. With so many variables with long mem-
ory a VAR system with many lags runs into serious identiﬁcation problems on
annual data, so this is not a feasible option here.
The basic ECM builds on the generic model
yt = β0 + β1xt + β2xt−1 + β3yt−1 + εt.
Under the assumption that β1+β2+β3 =1an ECM representation can be derived
by assuming a stationary long-run relation y − x
∆yt = β0 + β1∆xt +( β3 − 1)(yt−1 − xt−1)+εt.
With only around 45 usable observations–depending on the number of lags used
as instruments–and six age shares plus another ﬁve explanatory variables we
necessarily have to restrict this generic model. Since age shares are highly serially
correlated identiﬁcation problems arise if we include both current and lagged
values of the age shares. We use current values to achieve as little collinearity
18as possible with the other lagged explanatory variables.This does not invalidate
the basic idea. Instead of the generic model above we have
yt = β0 + β1xt + β3yt−1 + β4zt + ut
where z are other independent variables. Assuming now that β1 + β3 =1it is
easily seen that we can replace β1 =1− β3 and subtract yt−1 from both sides to
get the equivalent form
∆yt = β0 +( 1− β3)(xt − yt−1)+β4zt + ut
The basic level equation we have used previously is (2.5) and we only need include
a lag of residential investment in this to get an ECM representation of this form.






+ βr−1 + γ∆Q−1 + δ
0X + u (B.1)
19Table 1: Time series regressions on Swedish data 1950-1996. Least squares esti-
mates. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
up to 3 lags. Absolute t-values in parentheses, bold face marks estimates signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero on the 5 percent level. Q is the p-value for the Ljung-Box
Q-test for serial correlation in the residuals with 11 lags.
Dep. var. Residential construction Non-residential construction.
pure age model with lag pure age model with lag
Lag of dep. var. – 0.825 – 0.615
(8.09) (4.73)
Age 0-14 -0.536 -0.359 -0.262 -0.118
(2.62) (3.76) (2.68) (2.03)
Age 15-29 0.746 0.119 0.166 0.087
(2.76) (0.86) (1.60) (1.44)
Age 30-49 0.329 0.234 0.012 0.039
(3.65) (4.55) (0.23) (1.38)
Age 50-64 0.156 0.146 0.719 0.274
(0.43) (1.13) (4.91) (2.61)
Age 65-74 0.025 0.109 -0.228 -0.199
(0.07) (0.73) (1.81) (3.07)
Age 75+ -1.553 -0.649 -0.332 -0.132
(4.73) (3.04) (2.80) (1.60)
Adj R2 0.83 0.94 0.91 0.95
D-W 0.45 – 0.72 –
Q (p-values) 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.87
20Table 2: Time series regressions on Swedish data. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 3 lags. Absolute t-values in paren-
theses. Q is the p-value for the Ljung-Box Q-test for serial correlation in the
residuals up to 10 lags. Sargan is the p-value for a test of whether the overiden-
tifying restrictions implied by the instrument regressions hold. Restriction is the
p - v a l u ef o rt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h ec o e ﬃcient for the linear combination of age
variables is the same as the lagged residential investment coeﬃcient with opposite
sign, i.e. the coeﬃcient for the adjustment term in the ECM equation.




Age 0-14 -0.345 -0.222 -0.318
(4.79) (3.70) (4.14)
Age 15-29 1.311 1.184 1.221 (adjustment
(16.9) (7.71) (12.3) term)
Age 30-49 0.466 0.400 0.498 0.883
(13.9) (9.32) (11.8) (10.2)
Age 50-64 -0.589 -0.612 -0.757
(5.63) (3.97) (6.21)
Age 65-74 -0.754 -0.402 -0.071
(6.27) (1.56) (0.30)
Age 75+ -1.373 -1.545 -1.857
(15.7) (10.6) (8.83)
∆Q−1 0.642 0.694 1.625 0.569
(4.15) (3.51) (6.11) (3.51)
Real interest−1 -0.146 -0.050 -0.003 -0.058
(6.31) (0.86) (0.07) (1.68)
Tax reform 1991- 0.011 0.001
(3.91) (0.75)
Deregulation 1985- -0.009 0.002
(5.24) (0.87)
Adj R2 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.51
D-W 1.59 1.53 2.13 –
Q (p-values) 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.20
Sargan – 0.36 0.38 0.31
Restriction ECM 0.74
21Table 3: OECD 18 country annual sample 1964-1995. Sample of 539 obs. Stan-
dard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 3 lags.
Absolute t-values in parentheses.Wald tests for joint signiﬁcance of age variables.
Residential invest. Both eﬀects
LS TSLS
Age 15 to 29 0.153 0.153 0.139
(2.95) (3.01) (2.36)
Age 30 to 49 0.298 0.208 0.105
(3.10) (2.01) (0.90)
Age 50 to 64 0.198 0.097 0.006
(2.19) (1.00) (0.05)
Age 65 to 74 0.028 0.013 0.004
(0.23) (0.11) (0.03)
Age 75+ -0.808 -0.789 -0.728
(4.48) (4.47) (4.14)
Rel price of inv -0.038 -0.054
(3.82) (4.47)
Adj R2 0.15 0.21 0.17
χ2(5) age var: 44.7 40.5 34.6
sign level 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figure 1: The share of residential investment in Swedish GDP 1950-1996. The
dashed line shows predictions from the pure age model in Table 1. Residential
investment is from Byggentreprenörerna and GDP from Statistics Sweden. The
share 1993-2003 according to ENS National Accounts is shown for comparison
and to get an out-of-sample validation.
23Table 4: Time series regressions on Swedish data. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 3 lags. Absolute t-values in paren-
theses. Q is the Ljung-Box Q-test for no serial correlation up to 10 lags. Sargan
tests the overidentifying restrictions.
Dep. var. House price index Q ∆Q
LS TSLS
1953-78 1979-99 1953-78 1979-99 1953-78 1979-99
Age 0-14 0.223 +0.214 -0.195 +0.582 -0.221 -0.259
(3.98) (1.08) (1.03) (2.86) (4.59) (3.24)
Age 15-29 0.141 +4.223 0.350 +3.505 -0.037 -2.670
(4.35) (7.01) (2.82) (7.33) (1.06) (5.14)
Age 30-49 -0.096 -7.300 0.178 -5.743 0.117 +2.896
(3.67) (9.67) (1.68) (12.0) (4.57) (3.37)
Age 50-64 -0.216 +0.343 -0.608 +0.604 0.070 +0.008
(6.13) (3.17) (2.91) (2.78) (1.28) (0.09)
Age 65-74 -0.658 +4.547 1.754 +0.239 0.539 -0.246
(1.44) (4.05) (1.14) (0.15) (1.63) (0.34)
Age 75+ 1.827 +7.672 -1.473 +8.578 -1.257 -2.194







Adj R2 0.88 0.87 0.65
D-W 1.75 2.04 1.87
Q (p-values) 0.00 0.65 0.01
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Figure 2: Evolution of population shares of age groups in Sweden. The last 10
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Figure 3: House price index in Sweden 1952-1999 compared to the pure age model
of house prices.
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